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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and IVAN L • THURMAN I 
Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 15640 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the following as a reply 
to defendant Thurman's brief in this case. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT THURMAN HAS NOT ESTABLISHED AN "ACCIDENT" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE LAW. 
A survey of all of the Utah cases in which the question 
of whether an accident had occurred was the issue confirms that 
the defendant Thurman has not sustained the burden of proof in this 
issue. The earliest case on the subject defined "accident" as 
"the ~of the injury, and it is here used in its ordinary and 
popular sense, as denoting an unlooked for mishap, or an unthwarted 
event, which is not expected or designed by the workman himself. " 
!!E._tic Milling Co. v. Industrial Cornn., 60 Ut. 14, 206 P.278, 280 
ll922). (Emphasis added.) This is reconfirmed in Bamburger Coal 
~Industrial Cornn., 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103 (1925) where 
this Court said that there must be "some showing that at a particu-
lar t · d f lme and place something unusual or unexpecte or un orseen 
had occurred; in other words that there had been an accident." Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
240 P. at 1104. That concept has been reaffirmed recently when 
this Court said that an accident "connotes an unanticipated, un-
intended occurrence different from what would normally be expected 
to occur in the usual course of events." Carling v. Industrial Corr:. 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P. 2d 202, 203 (1965). 
This Court has also agreed that if there is an unusual 
strain or an overexertion, that that too can be considered an 
accident. As this Court said most recently, to qualify it would 
have to be "greater exertion than normally would be required." 
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Constr. & Mining Corp., 565 P. 2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1977). 
This Court has also discussed cases where someone 
experienc.3d pain or difficulty on the job. It has uniformly been 
held that if the employee has engaged in the same work for a 
long period of time and that the pain is discovered during the 
performance of the same type of work which the worker has been accc 
tomed to, the fact that the pain itself is unusual or unexpected 
does not constitute an accident. Woodburn v. Industrial Commis~ 
111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209 (1947); Pintar v. Industrial commi~ 
14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P. 2d 414 (1963); Mellen v. Industrial conun£ 
19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P. 2d 431 (1967); Redman Warehousing cori;!·_v. 
Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P. 2d 283 (1969); ~ 
vs. Industrial Commission, 558 P. 2d 1322 (Utah 1976). There are 
many other cases which have held exactly as above, but there is nc a 
point in citing them since they uniformly agree with each other. 
ti 
0\ 
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There is only one case where this Court specifically 
allowed an award without any evidence of an accident. Purity Biscuit 
co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961 (1949). 
That case appears to be an aberration and has been subsequently 
referred to as a "living corpse," Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, and as a "long and difficult to understand opinion". 
which has "never been cited by this court or any other court to 
support the law of that case." Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 373, 431 P. 2d 798 (1967). 
In the brief of defendant Thurman, there are two cases 
cited in support of the proposition that the way in which defendant's 
injury arose qualifies it as a compensable injury. The interesting 
thing about these two· cases is that neither one of them attempted 
to define "accident" and both of them are totally out of the main 
stream of the law as this Court has evolved it as to what constitutes 
an "accident". In the case of Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P. 2d 613 (1965), this Court simply and solely 
decided that the Industrial commission cannot ignore all competent 
and uncontroverted evidence. There was no determination whether or 
not there had been an accident involved. In Residential & Commercial 
~nstr. Co. v. Industrial commission, 529 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1974) this 
Court simply indicated that the Industrial Commission is the body 
not only to find the facts but to draw inferences as may be reason-
able. 
Whatever the reasons why this Court ruled as it did in 
the two aforementioned cases it is clear that neither of those cases 
outweigh the long list of cases which have consistently defined 
- 3 -
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"accident" in the te:r:ms of an unexpected event or unusual stress 
which is separate from and precedes the injury itself. Moreover, 
this Court has consistently required a causal connection between 
the unexpected event or the overexertion and the injury which is 
manifested. There have been at least fifteen ·Utah Supreme Court 
cases specifically establishing such a requirement. The only case 
in this Court's history which has given any support to the concept 
that if the injury suddenly appears, that that is sufficient to 
constitute "an accident" is the Purity Biscuit case which, as note: 
above, has essentially been overruled by subsequent cases. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS POWERS AND CONTMK 
TO THE LAW. 
Defendant Thurman has argued in his brief that the findi: 
made by the Industrial Commission should be sustained unless they a: 
arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to the law or evidence 
Defendant's Brief, page 7. Plaintiff does not argue with that 
definition but only with the application of that definition to the 
facts before this Court. 
As has been amply demonstrated above, the law in Utah de: 
not permit an award unless there is clear evidence of an accident. 
As it has been defined in Utah law, there was no accident in the ca 
of Mr. Thurman. Therefore the Industrial Commission was incorrect 
on the law in deciding as it did in favor of Mr. Thurman. 
- 4 -
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The testimony in this case, both in the original hearing 
as well as by the medical panel, is clear as to what happened medically. 
If the ruling of the Industrial Commission is to the effect that 
there was overexertion or that the injury to Mr. Thurman occurred 
as a work-related product, that is totally and completely a mis-
construction of the evidence. The evidence is clear that Mr. Thur-
man's difficulties occurred as he was standing up to answer the tele-
phone. He was not lifting a table or any chairs at the time. In 
fact, had he been lifting a table or chairs, that would have been 
part of his normal activity and not accidental. In any case, Mr. 
Thurman was not doing any work at all when the pain developed. 
Since the clear evidence in this case does not show any 
accident, the Industrial Commission did act contrary to law and 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
An employer has a difficult time in today's world determin-
ing whether a back injury occurring during the time an employee is 
on the job is compensable. Nevertheless, under the guidelines of 
the Workrnens' Compensation Law of Utah and under the definitions as 
established by this court, an employer has been able to weed out 
those cases where it was clear that there was no accident involved. 
If the ruling of the Industrial commission in this case is adopted, 
however, an employer will become financially responsible every time 
an employee has a manifestation of pain while he is working, whether 
or not the employee was engaged in work, was overexerting himself, 
- 5 -
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had a slip and fall, or whether he simply was experiencing the 
culmination of a degenerative process which, through its timing, 
manifested itself at work. If the Industrial Commission's posi-
tion in this case were accepted, the value of the word "accident" 
in the law would be eliminated and the definition of the word 
would be totally emasculated. There would thereafter be no need 
for the word to even remain as part of the statute. The only 
question would be not whether there was an accident but whether 
the injury manifested itself during the working hours, regardless 
of what the individual was engaged in doing. 
It cannot be believed that either the Legislature or 
this Court intended such a result. Reason and a long line of prece· 
dent clearly say that in this case there was no accident, that the 
Industrial Commission was in error in deciding as it did, and 
that the award to Mr. Thurman should be reversed. 
- 6 -
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